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ABSTRACT
Security practices in large organizations are notoriously dif-
ficult to assess. The challenge only increases when organiza-
tions turn to third parties to provide technology and busi-
ness services, which typically require tight network integra-
tion and sharing of confidential data, potentially increasing
the organization’s attack surface. The security maturity of
an organization describes how well it mitigates known risks
and responds to new threats. Today, maturity is typically
assessed with audits and questionnaires, which are difficult
to quantify, lack objectivity, and may not reflect current
threats.
This paper demonstrates how external measurement of
an organization can be used to assess the relative qual-
ity of security among organizations. Using a large dataset
from BitSight1, a cybersecurity ratings company, containing
3.2 billion measurements spanning nearly 37,000 organiza-
tions collected during calendar year 2015, we show how per-
organizational ‘risk vectors’ can be constructed that may
be related to an organization’s overall security posture, or
maturity. Using statistical analysis, we then study the cor-
relation between the risk vectors and botnet infections. For
example, we find that misconfigured TLS services, publicly
available unsecured protocols, and the use of peer-to-peer
file sharing correlate with organizations that have increased
rates of botnet infections. We argue that the methodology
used to identify these correlations can easily be applied to
other data to provide a growing picture of organizational
security using external measurement.
1. INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly connected world, organizations frequently
partner with third parties. A 2014 report by the Insti-
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tute for Internal Auditors found that 91% of organizations
partnered with technology vendors, 76% with business ser-
vice providers, and 40% formed strategic partnerships with
third parties [67]. These partnerships often entail shar-
ing confidential data and integrating network infrastructure,
potentially increasing an organization’s attack surface and
risk. One high profile example was the 2014 Target breach,
which exposed credit card information about 40 million cus-
tomers [31] when attackers stole a third party vendor’s cre-
dentials and used them to infiltrate the network [48].
Traditional approaches to managing the risk in such part-
nerships use risk assessment questionnaires [4, 8] and au-
dits [14]. The results are then interpreted with cyber threat
matrices [43], which provide a rough, qualitative snapshot of
risk. Such strategies are time consuming, expensive, and it
is unclear how effective they are. Although some efforts have
been made at standardization [4], there is currently no stan-
dard quantitative and objective approach to assessing risk in
these environments. Finally, although assessments, audits,
and compliance standards can point to vulnerabilities (po-
tential avenues of attack), they do not link these vulnerabili-
ties to actual outcomes. Thus, there is a need for a different
approach to the problem of understanding and mitigating
security risks in organizations. Ideally, such an approach
will be objective (not subject to self-interpretation), non-
invasive, quantitative, and it will reflect actual risk, rather
than hypothetical threats.
This paper addresses the need by presenting a rigorous,
data-driven methodology for assessing organizational risk
vectors. The methodology can inform an organization about
the risks posed by third-party partnerships, and it can help it
better understand its own risk profile, ultimately providing
guidance on how to improve the security of its internal net-
works. The methodology consists of three components: 1)a
mapping of network (IP) space to individual organizations
2) measurement of possible avenues of attack which we dub
‘risk vectors’ and 3) measurement of externally observable
security incidents.
We focus on risk vectors that can be measured externally
and objectively and show how they correlate with actual se-
curity incidents. We investigate three broad classes of risk
vectors: peer-to-peer file sharing, incorrect configuration of
Transport Layer Security (TLS) services, and the presence
of publicly available insecure communication protocols. For
simplicity, we focus on assessing risk using one type of se-
curity incident, the presence and prevalence of botnet infec-
tions within an organization. While there are myriad possi-
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ble security incidents to measure, botnets are a critical part
of the cybercrime infrastructure, and cost users upwards of
$10 billion in cleanup costs alone [3]. Because our method
is statistical in nature, it doesn’t identify root causes of any
particular security incident. Rather, it provides an overall
assessment of the security maturity of an organization, in
the same spirit as assessments and audits.
To investigate the link between risk vectors and botnet
infections, we begin with a large dataset consisting of over
3.2 billion network events measured across almost 37,000
organizations throughout 2015 (Section 2 C). IP addresses
are associated with specific organizations through a rigorous
and unique mapping process (Section 2 A). The mapping al-
lows us to use large-scale scans of the Internet and associate
specific kinds of events with a particular organization. Com-
bining these data with information about an organization’s
size and other properties (Section 2 B) allows us to nor-
malize measures of risk and botnet infection, study different
types of organizations, and make comparisons across similar
organizations.
With these data in hand, we show how they can be lever-
aged to develop statistical models to establish quantitative
relationships between risk vectors and botnet infections. We
find that each of the three categories of risk vector correlates
with the presence and prevalence of botnets within an orga-
nization. We also study how the effect2 of each risk vector
varies with the type of organization, finding significant dif-
ferences between different organization types.
We do not claim that the link between risk vectors and
botnet infections is causal. However, we do suggest that they
have a common cause—security immaturity. Failure to con-
figure TLS services correctly, making known insecure proto-
cols publicly available, and allowing employees to download
files that are likely infected with malware, are all indicative
of poor network security practices. Similarly, the failure
of an organization to detect and remove botnet infections
suggests that it probably lacks a systematic and thorough
approach to security. In this way, the paper shows how se-
curity maturity can be effectively assessed through external
measurements of risk vectors and infections.
Our results only focuses on a handful of risk vectors which
are externally observable, and one type of security incident.
However, our methodology is general and could easily be
expanded to more risk vectors and different security inci-
dents, e.g. data breaches and service interruptions. We be-
lieve that moving towards a more quantitative data-driven
view of risk assessment will be crucial in the future. Not only
will provide a clearer picture of cyber risk, but will help to
assess whether specific security lapses are associated with in-
cidents. This in turn will help security practitioners assess
and triage emerging threats for their specific organization.
In summary the paper makes several contributions:
1. A methodology for collecting security data about or-
ganizations using external measurements.
2. A demonstration of how to analyze the collected data
to gain insight about the relative security of organiza-
tions
3. Insights from the data including: a strong relationship
between peer-to-peer sharing activity and botnet infec-
tions, and differentiation of risk vectors across different
2We use the term effect in the statistical sense to indicate the
quantitative magnitude of a phenomenon [36]. Specifically
we do not mean it to imply a causal relationship.
industries.
4. A thorough discussion of how the methodology could
be expanded and used to cover other types of incidents
and risk vectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
elaborates on our process for data collection, organization,
and aggregation. Next section 3 provides an initial analy-
sis of the data and examines some of it’s basic properties.
Section 4 builds several models of risk vectors and botnet
infections. Section 6 cover related work. We conclude with
a discussion of the implications of our results and opportu-
nities for future work in section 5, and some final remarks
in section 7.
2. DATACOLLECTIONANDPROCESSING
This section describes the data collection and processing
that were used in this study. The dataset was collected
throughout 2015 by BitSight for use in their commercial
service. We discuss how the data was used to develop the
mapping of IP space to organizations, the measurement of
risk vectors, and the measurement of security outcomes.
2.1 Identifying anOrganizations Network Foot-
print
The first step to measuring an organizations security prac-
tices is to identify its overall network presence. Over the past
four years, BitSight has developed a process for identifying
the IP addresses associated with individual organizations,
which they use for in their commercial service. In this sec-
tion we give an overview of our process. A variety of methods
could be used to construct a mapping of IP space to organi-
zations, but it is crucial to make this mapping as accurate
as possible. Given the heavy tailed nature of security inci-
dents [23, 24], misc attribution of a security incident could
alter the assessment of an organization.
For this reason the process presented here utilizes a man-
ual verification step. Specifically, individual researchers con-
struct mappings for each organization, which is then inde-
pendently checked by another researcher. This process pre-
sented here is an improvement over the one used in [40] as
it uses additional information sources and completed and
verified manually.
Organizations are selected because they are economically
prominent (such as the Fortune 500 companies) or are re-
ferred for mapping through industry partners. A researcher
starts the mapping process by first identifying an organi-
zation’s web presence and main company domain. Next, a
company’s presence on social media as well as other public
sources are examined and information about the company is
gathered. This includes the industry in which the organiza-
tion operates and its number of employees. The number of
employees gives a rough estimate of the organization’s size,
which we use to normalize some of our other measurements
so meaningful comparisons between different organizations
can be made. This is an imperfect measure of size how-
ever, and we discuss some consequences in section 3, and
suggest how it might be improved in 5. Next, media sources
and financial fillings are used to identify any fully owned
subsidiaries of an organization. After this organizational
information is gathered, a manual search of BGP routing
information, regional internet registries, and other propri-
etary services are consulted to identify IP addresses which
are allocated to that organization and its subsidiaries.
We believe this represents a best-effort approach to accu-
rately identifying organizational ownership of IP addresses
and thus observed events and services. At the time these
data were collected, BitSight has mapped 1.8 billion IPv4
addresses (42% of the IPv4 Internet), enabling us to ob-
serve 36,982 distinct organizational entities in 2015. This
includes all of the Fortune 500 companies. However, any
methodology which endeavors to associate IP addresses to
organization will face many challenges, such as the deploy-
ment of DHCP and NAT and the increasing use of cloud ser-
vices. We believe our approach improves on previous similar
mapping techniques [40] by consulting multiple additional
sources, manual identification of IP ranges, and includes a
manual verification step.
2.2 Risk Vectors
Here we describe a handful of externally observable events
and system states, which we refer to as “risk vectors” (also
known as risk factors). Most are unlikely to directly cause
malware infections in and of themselves (though peer-to-
peer activity might be an exception); rather, they are in-
dicators of conditions in an organization that may lead to
malware infection or other security problems. That is, risk
vectors relate to an organization’s security maturity. We
consider three classes of risk vectors: peer-to-peer file shar-
ing, transport layer security, and network services.
2.2.1 Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
Peer-to-peer file sharing protocols are well-known security
risks. Research has shown that as many as 35% of torrent
files are infected with malware [15], and the infrastructure
itself can be used to propagate worms [32]. Since peer-to-
peer file sharing has only limited use in most enterprises,
many security-conscious organizations block BitTorrent by
default within their networks or prevent their users from
installing and running torrent clients. While other peer-
to-peer file sharing protocols exist we focus on BitTorrent
because it is the most popular protocol [55].
We identify peer-to-peer file sharing by collecting torrent
tracker lists from two of the largest open and public track-
ers. For each torrent in the tracker list we collect a list
of IP addresses are ‘seeding’ the file, meaning the IP ad-
dresses that have downloaded the complete file and made it
available for download by others. The IPs are then mapped
to organizations as described above. This provides a count
of the number of files actively shared by each organization,
which we normalize by the number of employees to produce
a per employee concentration. By counting the total num-
ber of files rather than IP addresses sharing, we believe we
obtain a more accurate representation of the prevalence of
file sharing than would be obtained by raw IP counts.
2.2.2 Transport Layer Security
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the backbone of en-
crypted internet communication and is often the target for
new attacks and vulnerabilities.
We track two different types of possible errors in the TLS
protocol, software configuration weaknesses and certificate
weaknesses. Software weaknesses are caused either by out-
of-date software or an administrative error in the configura-
tion of the service. Out-of-date software leaves the network
susceptible known vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed [21]
and FREAK [6], while the use of weak versions of the Diffie-
Helman key exchange could lead to eavesdropping [2]. It is
unlikely that TLS weaknesses would lead directly to mal-
ware infections at any measurable scale. More commonly,
the result is that some data are no longer communicated
confidentially. However, TLS issues provide an excellent in-
dicator of the state of an organization’s security maturity.
We derive data on the number, type, and configuration of
TLS services from Internet wide scans of IPv4. These scans
probe all of IPv4 space and attempt to identify any run-
ning services across a number of ports utilized for common
services [22]. 250 different ports commonly used for a vari-
ety of services were scanned. We limit our investigations to
ports offering TLS and 21 ports commonly associated with
popular services (see section 2.2.3). Scans were completed
roughly once per month, and if a TLS service was present, a
connection was established with the server, and the certifi-
cate presented as part of the process was saved for analysis.
While faster scanning processes exist [22], our approach uti-
lizes more in depth scanning, for example it tests all possible
encryption suites and protocol versions when establishing a
TLS connection. This less frequent scanning also reduces
the chance that the scans will be perceived as malicious and
blocked. Since we find little variance in the total number of
TLS services for each organization each month, we believe
that the scans are accurate enough for our purpose.
Certificate errors refer to problems with the certificates
used for authentication and the Public-Key Infrastructure.
The collected certificates were examined to determine if they
used keys created using weak cryptographic protocols, were
signed using cryptographically weak hash functions, or had
a suspicious chain of trust. Specifically, we collect informa-
tion on chain of trust issues including expired certificates,
certificates that were issued for a future date, self signed
certificates, and certificates whose chain of trust is broken.
Any of these errors alone could be benign, but all are po-
tentially exploitable by a determined attacker and relatively
easy to fix, and therefore a good candidate indicator of the
maturity of the organization.
Specifically, we looked for the following errors in software
configuration:
• TLS version less than or equal to SSLv3;
• The presence the Heartbleed or FREAK bugs;
• The presence of weak Diffie-Helman Key exchange, ei-
ther keys with less than 2048 bits or with commonly
used prime numbers;
and certificate errors, including:
• Self signed certificates, expired certificates, certificates
that were issued in the future, certificates with non-
standard roots, and certificates with a broken chain of
trust;
• Certificates with weak keys, specifically using RSA or
DSA with 1024 bits or less, or ECC with less than 224
bits;
• Certificates with weak signatures, including those signed
with SHA1, MD5, and MD2.
Larger organizations are likely to have a higher number of
TLS services. To be able to make comparisons across orga-
nizations, we calculate the fraction of TLS services that have
configuration and certificate errors. Each of these fractions
is used as a separate risk vector in our analysis.
2.2.3 Services
Finally, we measure how many and what kind of network
Table 1: Classification of publicly available services.
Service Class Classification Reason
FTP Risky Clear text communication
TELNET Risky Clear text communication
SMTP Risky Clear text communication
POP3 Risky Clear text communication
SUNRPC Risky Multiple vulnerabilities [49]
NETBIOS Risky Network foot-printing [63]
IMAP Risky Clear text communication
SNMP Risky Multiple vulnerabilities [11]
SMB Risky Multiple vulnerabilities [46]
MYSQL Risky Direct database access
MSSQL Risky Direct database access
RDP Risky Multiple vulnerabilities
POSTGRES Risky Direct database access
DNS Neutral Vulnerable but necessary
HTTP Neutral Vulnerable but necessary
NTP Neutral Vulnerable but necessary
SSH Reasonable Encrypted
HTTPS Reasonable Encrypted
SMTPS Reasonable Encrypted
IMAPS Reasonable Encrypted
POP3S Reasonable Encrypted
services the organization makes publicly available. While
scanning for TLS services we also scanned for other types
of services on other ports. Although any external commu-
nication service increases the attack surface of an organi-
zation, some services are safer than others. For example,
remote terminal access through SSH is encrypted and sup-
ports key-authentication, so it is preferred over terminal ac-
cess through Telnet, which transmits all data through plain
text, leaving an organization susceptible to eavesdropping
and interception of passwords and data [65].
We scanned 250 different services and categorized 21 fre-
quently used services into risky, neutral, and reasonable.
These services account for just under 95% of all services
seen in the scans and were selected because they were pop-
ular or posed significant security risks. Reasonable services
are those that can be exposed to the Internet with relative
little fear of easy exploit such as SSH, while risky services
should not be open to public access(telnet). Neutral services
are those which may be exploited given misconfiguration or
unpatched software, but are not inherently dangerous or are
required to be exposed to the outside world to be useful, for
example HTTP. These services are summarized in table 1.
For each organization we normalize by calculating the
fraction of known services that were classified as reasonable,
neutral and risky.
2.3 Botnet Infections
The above measures identify the network properties of an
organization, but do not directly measure security incidents.
In this paper we examine a common security incident: bot-
net infections. In this section, we describe how data from a
diverse number of botnets is collected as a measure of secu-
rity incidents within a company.
Botnet infection data is collected through Anubis Net-
works. Anubis Networks uses several techniques to infiltrate
botnet command and control structure so measurements of
individual infections can be taken. First, samples of mal-
ware are obtained and are reverse engineered to identify
how a particular bot communicates with its command and
control infrastructure. Many botnets communicate through
randomly generated domains, created using Domain Gener-
ating Algorithms(DGA) which are controlled by the botnets
master [50]. By reverse engineering the DGA used to create
these random domains, Anubis is able to register domains
consistent with the algorithm. Communications from the
infected client to these domains allows for the monitoring of
IPs associated with infections [18].
Some botnets have attempted to circumvent this type of
infiltration by using a peer-to-peer architecture to communi-
cate with the botnet master [29]. In these cases, a machine
controlled by Anubis executes the malware and communica-
tion with other members of the botnet is monitored. These
bot peers can then be queried to further investigate the peer-
to-peer structure.
Using this methodology, the activity of 120 different bot-
nets was monitored in 2015. In this time period over 650
million unique infection days were identified, where an in-
fection day is a unique IP address infected on a specific day.
For each organization we measure this count of infection
days on a monthly basis. For example, if an organization
has a single IP address which is infected for a single day in
a month, its infection day count is 1. Whereas if that single
IP address is infected for a week its infection day count is 7.
This measure allows us to measure the severity of infection
by both the total number of infected IP addresses and the
duration of infections. We then normalize these counts by
employee count to obtain a concentration of infection days
per employee per month. Because of the presence of NATs
and DHCP, these measurements represent a lower bound on
infection concentrations. We discuss how we might address
this in the future in section 5.
2.4 Data Aggregation
While it is conceivable that some of these data could be
collected continuously, for example the botnet data could be
collected in real time, most collection requires longer time
scales. Scanning available services requires roughly a month
to scan all the possible IPs associated with the organiza-
tions we are monitoring. Therefore, we aggregate the data
by month, producing monthly counts and rates for each or-
ganization. We found little variation in any of the measures
over time, so we averaged the values of the measured quan-
tities over the entire year. Future research could investigate
the impact of time, for example, how risk vectors and in-
fections change after major security incidents such as data
breaches.
3. ANALYSIS OF RISK VECTORS AND IN-
FECTIONS
This section examines the data aggregated in 2. First, we
investigate some of the basic properties of the data. Next,
we ask whether our risk vectors (peer-to-peer file sharing,
TLS errors, and publicly accessible services), correlate with
botnet infections. We find that risk vectors are correlated
with botnet infections in ways we would expect.
3.1 Risk Vectors
We begin the analysis by visualizing the distribution of
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Figure 1: Histograms of risk vectors and botnet in-
fections. Note that plots of botnet infections per
employee (A) and peer-to-peer file sharing per em-
ployee (B) are plotted on log scales, as they span
several orders of magnitude. All others are on lin-
ear scales. (A) appears as a slightly different color
as it is an outcome as opposed to the other variables
which are risk vectors.
each risk vector and infection variable plotted as histograms
in Figure 1.
Figure 1 demonstrates that organizations that have bot-
net activity, tend to have relatively low levels of botnet infec-
tions (90% of organizations with observed botnets, have less
than one bot per 12 employees). This does not account for
the 67% of organizations that have no botnet activity at all.
However, the data are highly skewed with botnet infections
per employee spanning several orders of magnitude. Peer-
to-peer file sharing has similar properties with the majority
of organizations having no peer-to-peer activity, and among
those that do 90% have less than 0.02 shares per employee.
In several cases there are more total infections (or shares)
than our estimate of the number of employees. For organi-
zations such universities or telecommunications companies,
this is likely the case, as there are far more machines with
the potential for bots and peer-to-peer sharing than actual
employees. We discuss possible alternative approaches to
normalization in section 5.
To account for the large number of zeros in the data we
analyze both the presence and prevalence of botnet infec-
tions and peer-to-peer file sharing in our analysis. Figure 1
also shows a large percentage of the measured values of cer-
tificate and service errors are either zero or one. That is,
for many organizations either all of their TLS services were
misconfigured or none were. In between these two values
we see a relatively smooth distribution. A similar property
can be seen in risky and reasonable services, though it is
not as pronounced, with both types of services experiencing
relatively high density at one. We discuss the implications
of this type of distribution in section 5.
3.2 Identifying Correlations Between Risk Vec-
tors and Infections
To establish whether a relationship exists between risk
vectors and security outcomes we use three statistical meth-
ods. When both measures are continuous, we use Spear-
man’s ρ, a nonlinear measure of correlation [19]. We use
Spearman’s ρ instead of the traditionally used Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient, because some of the relationships may
be nonlinear and we would like to capture any dependence
between the values.
When one value is continuous and the other is discrete,
for example the presence the existence of botnets and the
fraction of services which employ encryption, we use Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum text [42]. This test is similar
to the Student’s t-test in that it tests whether one partic-
ular distribution is larger than another, except it does not
rely on an assumption of normality for the underlying dis-
tributions 3. Finally, when both values are discrete, we use
a G-test, which is a measure of statical dependence in dis-
crete variables. It is recommended that the G-test be used
in situations where the χ2-test was traditionally used, as the
χ2-test was conceived as an easily calculable approximation
of the likelihood ratio test [59].
3.3 Risk Vectors and Infections
Because a large number of organizations experience no
botnet activity, we first test whether any of the risk vectors
are associated with the presence of bots in an organization.
To do this, we consider the distribution of each of the risk
vectors for organizations which we have measured botnet
activity and those which we have not. The results can be
see in figure 2.
A very clear relationship can be see in panel A) of figure 2:
organizations with peer-to-peer activity tend to have some
botnet activity, while those without peer-to-peer activity
tend to lack botnet activity(p < 10−12). For the other risk
factors the results are not easily visually discernible; how-
ever, we can establish the difference using statistical tests.
For three of the five remaining risk vectors, the relationship
between botnet infections and the risk vector is what we
would expect, organizations with bots generally have higher
levels of TLS certificate errors (D), risky services (E) and
lower levels of reasonable services (F). These differences are
statistically significant using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
rank test (p < 10−4).
Counter-intuitively the prevalence (shares per employee)
is slightly higher for organizations without bots (p < 10−12).
This is also the case in the difference in the distribution of
3We do not use the test to identify a difference in medi-
ans, which requires stronger assumptions about underlying
shapes of the distributions
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Figure 2: A) shows the percentages of organizations
with and without bots and the relative number of
those organizations that have peer-to-peer activity.
B) C) D) E) and F) are violin plots of the distri-
butions of risk vectors in organizations measured to
have botnet activity and those without botnet ac-
tivity. Each subplot contains a violin plot which is a
representation of the underlying distribution of val-
ues as represented by a Kernel Density Estimate.
Box and Whisker plots are also included showing
the 25% 50% and 75% quartiles(Box) and 1.5 times
the inner quartile range (Whiskers).
TLS configuration errors between organizations with bots
(p < 10−2), and those without. We discuss possible expla-
nations for these results in section 5.
3.4 Botnet and Risk Vector Correlation
The relationship between the count of IP addresses asso-
ciated with botnets per employee and various risk vectors is
plotted in Figure 3. Values of the Spearman’s Correlation
Coefficients can be seen in table 2.
We can see that peer-to-peer sharing has a strong positive
relationship to botnet infections. In particular we note that
it appears roughly linear on a log-log scale4. This may in-
dicate the existence of a power-law relationship. The other
variables have weak, but statistically significant linear rela-
4Bivariate linear regression on log transformed variables re-
vealed a slope of 0.879
Figure 3: Scatter plot of botnet activity and risk
vectors. Colors indicate the density of points in an
area (lighter colors are higher density, darker colors
are lower density). Densities in range from 0 to
0.041 in A), 0 to 0.36 in B), 0 to 0.35 in C), 0 to
0.59 in D), and 0 to 1.10 in E)
tionships to botnet infection rates.
The other risk vectors show weak but significant correla-
tions. The negative correlation between reasonable services
and botnet infections may at first seem counterintuitive, as
running any services, even if they are reasonable, would in-
crease an organizations attack surface, increasing the poten-
tial for infections. However, because we are measuring the
fraction of services which are reasonable, organizations with
a high fraction of reasonable services (and necessarily a lower
fraction of risky services), are likely to have a smaller attack
surface than those with a high fraction of risky services.
4. MODELING BOTNET INFECTIONS
This section examines the effect of the organizational risk
vectors on botnet infections. We start by constructing a
model that quantifies how the risk vectors are correlated
with botnet concentration. Next, we consider how these
correlations vary across different industries.
4.1 Modeling Approach
We use simple linear regression to model the effect of the
various risk vectors presented in sections 2 and 3 on botnet
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients between risk vec-
tors and botnet count per employee. All correlations
are significant at the p < 10−12 level.
Variable Spearman’s ρ
Concentration of Peer-to-Peer 0.725
TLS Configuration Errors 0.176
TLS Certificate Errors 0.174
Risky Services 0.138
Reasonable Services -0.151
infections. The relationship between peer-to-peer sharing
and botnet infections appears to be linear in figure 3. This
suggests that a linear multiple regression with appropriately
transformed variables is a reasonable method for studying
the effect of each risk vector on botnet infections [12].
4.1.1 Variable Transformation
Beginning with the peer-to-peer file sharing data shown
in in section 3, the apparent linear relationship with bot-
net infections a log/log scale suggests a type of power-law
relationship To incorporate this variable into our linear re-
gression, we would expect to log-transform the data first.
However, this would entail removing the 13.5% of organiza-
tions with zero peer-to-peer file sharing and non-zero con-
centrations of botnet infections, possibly biasing our results.
To avoid this problem, we separate the peer-to-peer data
into two variables [34]: 1) an indicator random variable (bi-
nary variable) that is one if the peer-to-peer file sharing
value is zero and 2) a transformed variable calculated as
log(concentration of peer-to-peer shares). Specifically, if t is
the number of files being shared per employee, we calculate
the indicator random variable, t0, as
t0 =
{
1, if t = 0
0, otherwise
(1)
and the transformed variable tˆ as
tˆ =
{
log(t), if t > 0
0, otherwise
(2)
.
This transformation is useful in two ways. First it allows
us to incorporate the observed log/log relationship while in-
cluding all of data points. Second, it allows us to measure
both the effect of both presence and prevalence of file shar-
ing.
4.1.2 Regression Model
Because the rest of the variables presented in section 3 do
not span multiple orders of magnitude and have a roughly
linear relationship with botnet infections, we can include
them as linear terms in the regression. Our final regression
model is
log(b) =β1t0 + β2tˆ+
β3TCF + β4TCT+
β5SRi + β6SRe+
β0 +N(0, σ) (3)
(Intercept)
Percent of Risky Services
Percent of TLS with Cert Errors
Percent of Reasonable Services
Percent of TLS with Config Errors
File Shares per Employee
No File Shares
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Figure 4: Plot of the regression coefficients from
equation 3. An estimate of each coefficient’s distri-
bution is given as a Kernel Density estimate on each
line. Solid lines below represent 98% confidence in-
tervals and dark blue lines are significant at p < 0.01.
Table 3: Estimated Coefficients for the model de-
scribed in 3. All value are statistically significant at
the p < .005 level, except for the Intercept which is
significant at the p < 0.1 level.
Variable Coefficient Estimate
Peer-to-Peer Blocked (t0) β1 -5.763
Peer-to-Peer Concentration (tˆ) β2 0.841
TLS Configuration Errors (TCF ) β3 0.512
TLS Certificate Errors (TCT ) β4 0.638
Risky Services (SRi) β5 0.509
Reasonable Services (SRe) β6 -0.493
Intercept β0 -0.167
R2 0.458
where b is botnets per employee, t0 and tˆ are the trans-
formed variables from equations 1 and 2 respectively; TCF
is the fraction of TLS services with configuration errors; TCT
is the fraction of TLS certificates with certificate errors; SRi
is the fraction of risky services; SRe is the fraction of reason-
able services; β0 is the intercept; and N(0, σ) is the normal
distribution of residuals with mean 0 and standard deviation
σ.
4.2 Regression Results
We determined the coefficients βi in equation 3 using ordi-
nary least squares. Post-regression diagnostics indicate that
it is unlikely our coefficients estimates are biased. The ex-
act coefficients are shown in table 3 and depicted visually in
Figure 4.
The results of the regression indicate that the measured
risk vectors affect the concentration of bots in the expected
way. Organizations with high concentrations of peer-to-peer
sharing, risky services, and configuration and certificate er-
rors, tend to have higher concentrations of botnet infections.
Figure 4 illustrates the difference in effect size between
each of the variables. Interestingly, we see that the indicator
variable for peer-to-peer sharing has the largest effect. In
particular, we calculate using the model (equation 3) that
organizations that allow peer-to-peer file sharing have, all
other things being equal, more than 318 times the number
of bots per employee5. We explore the reasons for this large
effect in the next section and the section 5. We can calculate
the effects for other variables, for example, organizations
with 10% higher peer-to-peer file sharing per employee have
an 8.3% higher rate of botnet infections. Organizations with
no TLS certificate errors have 14% lower botnet infections
than those with a 25% misconfiguration rate.
The variation in the estimates for each variable seen in
figure 4 is also interesting. The narrow variation in the
concentration of peer-to-peer sharing indicates a consistent
effect across different organizations, while the wider vari-
ation seen in risky services indicates an inconsistent effect
which perhaps varies significantly across different organiza-
tion types. For example, we hypothesize that the reason
for the weak effect is that in some organizations, risky ser-
vices might be necessary and appropriately handled, even
if in general this risk vector is associated with higher levels
of botnet infections. We explore how the effect of different
industries influences these relationships in the next section.
4.3 Industry Effects
Next, we ask whether or not the risk vectors have different
effects in different industry types. For example, telecommu-
nications companies and universities typically have less con-
trol over the computers connected to their networks and this
may lead to higher botnet infection rates. This effect can be
see in figure 5, where the distribution of botnet infections
for various industries is plotted. As a more rigorous test, we
conducted a pairwise comparison of botnet infection distri-
butions between all industries using a Kolomogorov-Smirnov
test [58]. Among the 231 possible industry comparisons,
63% indicated that botnet distributions between industries
differed. We discuss more refined groupings of industries in
section 5.
This suggests that the model in equation 3 captures only
some of the relevant behavior and that more detailed industry-
specific models may be appropriate. There are several pos-
sible approaches that could be used, e.g., we could include
an indicator random variable for each industry (fixed ef-
fect model), we could allow a different intercept for each
industry (random effect model), or we could refit the regres-
sion model once for each industry (an un-pooled model).
Each of these approaches will result in a more accurate rep-
resentation of the data, but at the expense of potentially
unnecessary complexity. We use Akaike Information Crite-
ria (AIC) [9] to select among different possible models AIC
considers the model’s goodness of fit and penalizes its com-
plexity. We found that the most complex model, a separate
regression for each industry, gives the minimum (preferred)
AIC despite the large number of variables (154). The results
5When the dependent variable is log-transformed, a one unit
change in an independent variable results in an eβi change
in the dependent variable. Organizations that block peer-
to-peer sharing have e−5.763 = 0.00314 times lower botnet
infections rate, or inversely 1/0.00314 = 318 higher botnet
infection rate
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Figure 5: Distribution of botnet concentration by
industry. Note the log scale, indicating that some
industries typically have many orders of magnitude
more botnets per employee than others.
are shown in figure 66.
The above plot shows how the effect of risk vectors varies
across industries. The only consistent effect across all indus-
tries is peer-to-peer file sharing (Columns A and B). This
indicates that the large effect observed in section 4.2 is not
confined to organizations with a large number of hosts per
employee, e.g., telecommunications and education. In par-
ticular, Column A has one of the smallest effects for ed-
ucational organizations. And, Column B (concentration of
peer-to-peer file sharing) is one of the most consistent across
industries, with comparatively low variation compared to
the other coefficients.
Among industries, the effect of the other variables is mixed.
For most variables and most industries, when significant ef-
fects are present, they affect botnet infections in the direc-
tion we would expect. TLS configuration, certificate errors,
and risky services all increase botnet infections, while infec-
tion rates decrease as the fraction of safe services increases.
There is one possible exception to this trend, in Column
E (risky services). The presence of a large fraction of risky
services decreases botnet infections within the real-estate in-
dustry. This effect is not significant at the p < 0.01 level but
is at the (p < 0.015) level. This puzzling finding is warrants
6For brevity, we do not give the exact values of all 154 co-
efficients and their standard errors here; however, we will
make them available before publication.
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Figure 6: Visual representation of coefficients for the un-pooled regression model. Each panel (A-G) shows
the coefficients for each industry in the vertical axis. Each bar represents the 98% confidence interval around
the coefficient estimate. Estimates which are statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level are blue. Non-
statistically significant estimates are in grey.
further investigation.
Finally, for most industries not all risk vectors have a sig-
nificant effect on botnet infections. For example, having
a high fraction of reasonable services is significant in only
Government/Politics, Business Services, and Telecommuni-
cations industries. Similarly, TLS configuration and certifi-
cate errors only affect a handful of industries.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section we highlight some of the more interesting
results arising from our analysis, and we discuss threats to
the validity of the results. We conclude by exploring a num-
ber of possible future research opportunities suggested by
this rich data set and the analysis.
Figure 2 showed, counterintuitively, that organizations
with bots tend to have lower concentrations of peer-to-peer
file sharing as opposed to those with no botnet activity. A
second surprising result is organizations with botnet infec-
tions do not have more TLS configuration errors than those
without bots. Although we do not have a definitive explana-
tion for these two unexpected results, we speculate that they
could be caused by having set an unrealistic threshold of zero
for low botnet activity. It is unlikely that over the course
of an entire year any organization would be completely free
of botnet infections. Other more reasonable thresholds for
errors may provide a clearer and more intuitive picture.
Among the risk vectors we studied, the presence and preva-
lence of peer-to-peer file sharing through BitTorrent had the
largest effect on botnet concentrations among organizations
that showed signs of infection. Initially we hypothesized
that this was an artifact of normalizing organization size us-
ing employee counts rather than number of computers. If
true, we would expect to see differences in the un-pooled re-
gression study. However, peer-to-peer file sharing had a con-
sistent effect across all industries. Research on file sharing
has focused on the performance and security of the protocol
itself, rather than on the security risks it creates as a side
effect (see section 6).
We reiterate that our analysis has identified correlations
and that the risk vectors are not necessarily causal. For ex-
ample, it is unlikely that an expired TLS certificate would
lead directly to a botnet infection. However, given the preva-
lence of malware present in files shared through BitTor-
rent[15], it is possible that some of the infections we mea-
sured are the direct result of file sharing. The most likely
cause for the relationships we see is that both risk vectors
and botnet infections arise from the same common cause:
security immaturity. For example, organizations that don’t
prevent the use of peer-to-peer file sharing may also have
difficulty identifying and cleaning up botnet infections.
When we created the un-pooled regression model by in-
dustry we found only one surprising result: in the real estate
industry, a high fraction of risky services is associated with
lower levels of botnet infections. This anomalous result does
not have an obvious explanation.
Many of the risk vectors did not have significant statistical
effects in the un-pooled regression. This could be an artifact
of how we defined the risk vectors originally. For example,
we give equal weight to all TLS errors, but some errors may
be more indicative than others. A second possibility is that
there are real differences in risks in different industries. For
example, correct TLS configuration may be less important
in the aerospace industry because its main business does
not involve communicating customer data. In the future, an
organization might use the kind of analysis presented here
to prioritize which security issues to address first.
5.1 Caveats and Threats to Validity
As with any large-scale study, our data might be incom-
plete or biased. Variation in monthly scans was small, but
even this small amount of variation may indicate that we are
missing some data. We mitigate this issue by aggregating
monthly data into a single yearly measure for each organi-
zation. In the future, higher resolution data might provide
additional insights.
As discussed earlier, we measure organization size in terms
of employee counts, assuming that this is a good proxy for
of the actual number of computers within the organization.
What we actually care about is the number of computers
connected to each organization’s network. However, to our
knowledge there is no straightforward way to obtain such
a count. We know, for example, that employee count is
not particularly accurate for Telecommunications companies
(because employee counts miss all the customers and their
computers). We also know that in educational institutions,
students are not included in employee counts. A potential
alternative would be to estimate organization by counting
the total number of IP addresses associated with it. We
have experimented with this measure informally with similar
results.
Any measurement that assesses network properties based
on IP addresses will be inexact. The presence of NATs and
DHCP and cloud service technology will affect the accu-
racy of our mapping. For example, the extensive use of
cloud services may shrink the perceived network footprint
of an organization while inflating that of the cloud service
provider. Network volatility, specifically the reallocation
of IP addresses, also make identifying the exact network
boundaries of an organization difficult. We did our best
to mitigate the effects caused by these network practices.
For example, file sharing was measured on a per file basis
rather than a per IP basis and infections were measured on
an infection per day basis. In both cases our measurements
provide a lower bound on the measurement of interest. In
the future, some of these measurements could be refined.
Indirect methods for measuring botnet size have been pro-
posed [25], and some botnets utilize unique identifiers for
individual infections which could separate infections on a
single IP address [60]. Additionally, data on the internal
structure of organizational networks may provide more ac-
curate measures of risk vector and infection concentrations.
One of our main results indicates that peer-to-peer com-
munication has a strong correlation with botnet infections.
Previous work has demonstrated that some botnets have
adopted peer-to-peer communication in attempt to grow
more robust [29]. It has also been shown that the BitTorrent
protocol itself can be used as a cover channel [16], though
no study has observed this channel used in a botnet in the
wild. However, our measurement of peer-to-peer file sharing
focuses on IP addresses that are advertising popular files for
download, and we believe it is unlikely that these popular
files are being used for covert communication.
We use linear modeling in section 4, because our prelimi-
nary analysis (section 3) indicated that for most risk vectors
linearity (under transformation) was a reasonable assump-
tion. However, we note that in figure 1 many of the vari-
ables have a multi-modal distribution, which implies more
complexity than we have captured in our linear regressions.
However, figure 3 suggests that these extrema are unlikely
to bias our our results. We also explored using multiple vari-
ables to represent these multimodal distributions (similar to
the way we handled peer-to-peer sharing with equation 1),
but models with these transformed variables did not improve
the fit of the model and yielded equivalent results to those
seen in section 4.
5.2 Future Work
Future work could address the completeness of the data
set by using statistical techniques to identify the true pop-
ulation size, both for risk vectors and for outcomes. Mark
and recapture methods, originally developed for estimating
species populations in ecology, have already been used to es-
timate the true size of botnets [68]. These methods could be
used to improve our estimates of botnets and risk vectors.
We have simplified some risk vectors, for convenience and
ease of interpretation. For example, we weight all TLS soft-
ware errors equally, although it is unlikely that they are
all equally risky. For example, an organization that uses
the theoretically weak 1024-bit Diffie-Helman key exchange
may not actually experience more attacks. Similarly, we
made a rough classification of services into risky and rea-
sonable. Services we did not investigate may be strong indi-
cators of negative organizational outcomes. These nuances
may explain the multi-modal distributions observed in fig-
ure 1. However, separating out these effects is challenging
because of concerns about statistical independence. More
complex modeling approaches, such as hierarchical models,
could help identify more precise relationships.
While the current set of risk vectors can explain nearly half
the variation we seen in botnet infection rates (R2 = 0.49),
there are certainly other measures of security maturity that
could be include to give a more complete picture of security
maturity. We analyzed 21 different services and roughly
categorized them into risky, neutral and reasonable. Other
services and a finer categorization may provide more de-
tailed results. Additionally, internal organizational practices
are likely a good measure of security maturity. For exam-
ple, password policies, security training, and internal access
control policies are likely to reflect the security maturity of
an organization and correlate with outcomes like botnet in-
fections. Quantifying these properties and identifying their
effect is rich ground for future work.
Although we examined several different methods to ac-
count for difference across industries, there are many more
possibilities. Figures 5 and 6 show botnet infections and
the effect of risk vectors vary across industries. However, it
is possible that better groupings of industries could provide
more insight in how risk vectors affect security outcomes.
In this paper, we focused on botnets as a measure of nega-
tive outcomes for organizations. However, the methodology
can easily be applied to other security problems, such as data
breaches or blacklists (for sending spam, port scanning, or
hosting malware). Our preliminary results on these other
outcomes are consistent with those presented for botnets.
As one example of generalizing to other problems, we ex-
amined a small set of data breaches experienced by the orga-
nizations in our study. The data were collected in a variety of
ways, such as scraping news articles, Freedom of Information
Act requests, and some private data streams. We considered
two possible risk factors (peer-to-peer or botnet activity7),
and found that organizations with data breaches are likely
to also have these risk factors (Figure 7). This effect is sta-
tistically significant according to the G-test (p < 10−12).
This preliminary work is promising but requires additional
study and validation before we can draw firm conclusions.
6. RELATEDWORK
7Although botnet activity is an outcome in the earlier sec-
tions, here we treat it as a risk factor itself.
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Figure 7: Percentages of organizations which expe-
rienced breaches with and without botnet activity
and peer-to-peer activity.
In this section we review work related to that presented
in this paper. We find that research as focused on iden-
tifying vulnerabilities and elaborating on why they might
put organizations at risk, there has been surprisingly little
work linking risk vectors to actual outcomes such as botnet
infections.
Work on BitTorrent has primarily focused on measuring
the use of the protocol as a method for peer-to-peer file
distribution [51], it’s performance [7], the security of its dis-
tributed hash table algorithm [62], and studies of attacks
against the protocol [37, 32]. However, there has been little
work studying the potential danger of the use of the protocol
in the wild. To our knowledge, only one paper by Cuevas
examined the dangers of BitTorrent identifying that 35% of
files shared on through BitTorrent are fake, and of those
more than 99% contain malware or phishing attempts [15].
Our work is the first which actually examine this correlation
between the use of peer-to-peer file sharing in organizations
and botnet infections.
In contrast, the Transport Layer Security protocol, and
its predecessor the Secure Socket Layer protocol, have been
widely known to be a source of vulnerabilities. One re-
cent and widely publicized was the “Heartbleed” vulnera-
bility which allowed attackers to remotely read protected
memory on servers hosting vulnerable websites [21]. Other
research has shown that many of the available cryptographic
protocols used to communicate, and hash functions used to
sign certificates are vulnerable to a variety of attacks [6, 2,
27, 66, 20, 54]. There have also been work suggesting that
the certificate infrastructure itself is a target for hackers, in
particular one of the major certificate authorities, Verisgn,
was the subject of numerous successful attacks in 2010 [44].
While this work speaks to the insecurity of various imple-
mentations and configurations of TLS, and the certificate
infrastructure in general, it does provide a direct link be-
tween the problems of TLS and outcomes for organizations.
Reports have linked exploitation of the Heartbleed bug to
the compromise of 4.5 million patient records in an attack
against Community Health Systems [39], an unknown num-
ber of records against the website “Mumsnet” [52], and a
compromise of an unknown number of records from Cana-
dian Revenue Agency [56]. However, no work to our knowl-
edge has investigated the relationship between vulnerable
TLS services and botnet infections.
The case is similar for various types of services. As we
outline in section 2, there has been extensive research on
developing attacks for a number of the protocols we collect
data on including FTP [41], TELNET [35], and Microsoft
SQL [10]. Moreover, techniques have been developed for
automatically generating attacks against a variety of proto-
cols [30]. However, as of now we find no work linking the
presence or use of these services to negative outcomes, as we
do in this paper.
Botnets are recognized as a costly part of the cybercrim-
inal infrastructure [3], and a good deal of research has been
devoted to detecting [26], measuring [1, 18], classifying [17]
and fighting them [64, 5]. Similar to the research presented
in this paper, some work focuses on measuring relative bot-
net infections within various types of organizations. For
example Stone-Gross et al. focused on ISPs with persistent
malicious behavior [61]. Edwards et al. studied the concen-
tration of spam sending IP addresses within Internet Service
providers, and examined some risk vectors(including eco-
nomic, geographic, and connectivity) for high levels of spam
concentrations [24]. Other work has focused identifying high
concentrations of infected IP addresses in certain parts of
the Internet [47, 53, 13]. Yen et al. explored malware infec-
tions in a single large enterprise, and identify possible entry
points for infection on individual hosts, but do not provide
a comparison across a large number of organizations as we
do here [70].
Little work linking the network characteristics of orga-
nizations with security incidents across a broad number of
organizations. Zhang et al. found that higher concentrations
of different types of network mismanagement such as open
DNS resolvers and SMTP relays lead to high concentrations
of infected PCs within different Autonomous Systems [71].
Our work focuses on an organizational level, and considers a
broader scope of risk vectors which are correlated with net-
work infections. Liu et al. use a similar but much larger set of
network features (258) of organizations and machine learn-
ing to predict data breaches [40]. While they make some
effort to rank features on their relative importance, using
a random forest limits their ability to directly quantify the
impact of risk vectors as we do here.
In the past there have been calls to better understand se-
curity at the organizational level [69]. However, research de-
veloping qualitative models of organizational security have
been difficult to validate [38, 57]. Others have tried to in-
vestigate organizations security culture. Merete et al. study
common information security practices across organizations
in Norway [45], and Furnell et al. investigate how organiza-
tional culture can be utilized to increase security [28]. Re-
cent work has tested organizations response to being told
informed about spam sending infections, both publicly and
privately [33]. However, none of this work makes a direct
connection to organizational maturity and the likelihood of
incident such as botnet infections.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The ability to assess security risks in organizations is crit-
ical, both internally and externally. Internally, those who
are most responsible for a company’s performance, e.g., the
CEO or Board of Directors, often lack the technical skills
to assess their own IT systems, especially for security risks.
The evidence-based approach described in this paper pro-
vides an objective and quantitative method that goes be-
yond self-reporting or qualitative audits. From an external
perspective, these methods could be used by one organiza-
tion to guide decisions about outsourcing or partnerships,
and they could potentially be used in settings like insurance
where quantifying risk is essential. Current approaches pro-
vide only the most general idea of exactly what practices
and vectors expose organizations to minor incidents such as
malware infection or major incidents such as data breaches,
business interruptions, and financial and intellectual theft.
Although the results in this paper represent a first cut at
developing a robust quantitative approach to assessing se-
curity risks, the methods could readily be applied to other
data sources, other risk vectors, and other security problems.
Even as a first cut, our results are promising. We found
that 90% of organizations have low levels of botnet infections
(fewer than 1 botnet infection per 12 employees) however,
infection rates can span many orders of magnitude. Us-
ing a simple, linear regression approach, we found that the
presence and prevalence of peer-to-peer file sharing through
the BitTorrent protocol, TLS errors, and publicly available
services are all correlated with concentrations of botnet in-
fections. In particular we find that organizations which have
peer-to-peer activity have, on average, 318 times higher con-
centrations of bot. When we evaluate different industries
separately, a similar large effect was consistently observed
all different industries; however, other risk vectors are only
significantly related to botnet infections in a handful indus-
tries.
In conclusion, we argue that a data-driven, statistically
principled approach is the best way to identify objective
risks within an organization. Identifying what risk vectors
and minor incidents are correlated with major incidents such
as data breaches is an important next step in understanding
security maturity.
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